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Abstract
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asym-
metric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple
competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate
in an attempt to make some proﬁt. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo
(1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric infor-
mation. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)’s coarse core. It is never
empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson’s ﬁne core. In addition,
it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is
replicated.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study the allocation of scarce resources be-
tween agents that are asymmetrically informed about the fundamentals of the
economy. I assume for simplicity that the true state of the economy is veriﬁable
when the contracts are implemented. Incentive and measurability constraints
are therefore irrelevant.
The main reference for core concepts is Wilson (1978). An agreement speciﬁes
a way to split the endowment of the economy among the agents in each state.
Such a function is called a feasible allocation rule. Wilson discusses various
notions of objection against given feasible allocation rules. They diﬀer by
the amount of communication that is permitted between the agents. Two
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1polar notions emerged: coarse objections are based on events that are common
knowledge among the members of the coalition; ﬁne objections are based on
events that can be discerned by pooling the information of the members of
the coalition. Every coarse objection is a ﬁne objection. Hence the ﬁne core is
a subset of the coarse core.
The agents are cooperating on their own in Wilson’s theory. Objections emerge
from coalitions. I study an alternative approach where uninformed interme-
diaries help the agents to coordinate in an attempt to make some proﬁt.
They compete a la Bertrand. The intermediaries correctly anticipate the set
of agents that are going to buy the contracts (net trade vectors) they oﬀer.
Even without communication, this set may vary with the future state of the
economy as each agent’s decision is based on his own private information. This
leads to an endogenous determination of the coalition that is going to form
as a function of the state. In other words, I extend the competitive screening
argument of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to coalition formation.
The very presence of asymmetric information implies that the agents will have
diﬃculty to perform mutually beneﬁcial exchange and insurance without the
help of outside institutions. Perez-Castrillo (1994) observes:
It is easy to ﬁnd many situations in which, in order to achieve cooperation,
coalitions are formed by the initiative of its own members. (...) On many
other occasions, however, it is diﬃcult for the agents to join a coalition.
Information problems between agents, absence of communication mecha-
nisms, or just the incentive problems that arise when people try to work
cooperatively can make the formation of coalitions diﬃcult. In these cases,
‘exogenous’ agents or institutions may be interested in achieving the emer-
gence of these groups. Given that a coalition can generate proﬁts, it seems
that it should be possible to ﬁnd a payment scheme that will make it worth-
while for the agents to join the group. When there are several exogenous
agents that may be interested in creating such groups, they will compete
in order to attract agents to their coalitions. Solution concepts from nonco-
operative game theory are then appropriate for the analysis of this type of
competition.
My paper extends the results of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies
with non transferable utility and asymmetric information.
The set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes associated with the compet-
itive screening game constitutes a natural notion of core. I prove that it coin-
cides with the core (as usually deﬁned thanks to the Arrow-Debreu contingent
goods) of a ﬁctitious exchange economy with symmetric information. The ﬁcti-
tious agents are deﬁned as in the type-agent representation of Bayesian games
suggested by Harsanyi (1967-68) in order to deﬁne the concept of Bayesian
2equilibrium. My new notion of core is therefore called the type-agent core.
The type-agent core is a subset of the coarse core. I propose an example
where it is even a strict subset of the ﬁne core. Although the ﬁne core may be
empty, the type-agent core is never empty. Wilson (1978, footnote 6) deﬁnes
a notion of constrained market equilibrium as a technical tool to prove the
non-emptiness of the coarse core. I show that, under mild conditions, the set
of constrained market equilibria is a subset of the type-agent core and that
the type-agent core shrinks towards the set of constrained market equilibria as
the economy is replicated. Such a convergence result is rather unexpected as
Serrano et al. (2001) show that neither the coarse nor the ﬁne cores converge
towards the set of constrained market equilibria when the economy is repli-
cated. More than that, they show that the negative result is robust against
many alternative deﬁnitions of both the core and the price equilibria.
2 Framework
The model is the same as in Wilson (1978). Let N be the ﬁnite set of agents.
Let L be the ﬁnite set of goods. The future state of the economy is uncer-
tain. Let Ω be the ﬁnite set of possible states. Let π be the common prior
that describes the relative probability of those states. I assume without loss of
generality that π(ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ Ω. The agents may have some private
information. The information of agent i is summarized by a partition Pi of
the set Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω, let Pi(ω) be the atom of the partition that contains
ω. The interpretation goes as follows. When the future state of the economy
is ω, agent i knows and only knows that it will be an element of Pi(ω). His
beliefs are derived from π by Bayesian updating. Events are subsets of Ω. The
probability π(ω|E) of any state ω given an event E equals 0 if ω ∈ Ω \ E and
equals π(ω)/π(E) if ω ∈ E. The true state of the economy is common knowl-
edge among the agents at some future date. It determines their preferences
and endowments. Let ei : Ω → RL
+ be the function that speciﬁes the initial
endowment of agent i and let ui : RL
+ × Ω → R be the function that speciﬁes
his preferences. The agents maximize their expected utilities when facing some
uncertainty. The utility function of each agent is strongly increasing (x0 
 x
implies ui(x0,ω) > ui(x,ω) for each ω ∈ Ω), continuous and concave in each
state of the economy. Decisions are taken today about the way to redistribute
the endowments when the state will be common knowledge. An allocation rule
is a function a : Ω → RL×N




i∈N ei(ω) for each
ω ∈ Ω. There are typically opportunities for insurance, even if the agents are
asymmetrically informed. The expected utility of agent i for some allocation
rule a conditional on some event E is E(ui(ai)|E) =
P
ω∈Ω π(ω|E)ui(ai(ω),ω).
The model boils down to a classical exchange economy when there is only one
possible state. It coincides with the traditional model of exchange economies
3with uncertainty and symmetric information when Pi = {Ω} for each i ∈ N.
3 Deﬁnition
Let a be an allocation rule that one sees as a potential outcome. I test it
against some alternative allocation rule a0. Let D(a,a0,ω) denote the set of
deviators should ω be the future state of the economy. It is the set of agents
that prefer (given their private information) to receive a0 instead of keeping a:
D(a,a
0,ω) := {i ∈ N|E(ui(a
0
i)|Pi(ω)) > E(ui(ai)|Pi(ω))}
for each ω ∈ Ω.









for each ω ∈ Ω, the inequality being strict for some ω ∈ Ω.
An allocation rule a is blocked if there exists an allocation rule a0 that is strictly
feasible when proposed against a. A dummy player with no endowment and
no information can obtain a strictly positive amount of some good in some
state of the economy by challenging a and proposing a0.
The type-agent core is the set of feasible allocation rules that are not blocked.
Observe that the type-agent core coincides with the usual notion of core when
there is no uncertainty (i.e. #Ω = 1).
I will show in the next section how the type-agent core emerges from a sim-
ple competitive screening game. Before doing that, I justify the terminology. I
adapt the idea of Harsanyi (1967-68), who deﬁnes a Bayesian equilibrium to be
any Nash equilibrium of the type-agent representation of the original Bayesian
game. I suggest the following type-agent representation of the economy de-
scribed in section 2. It is a (ﬁctitious) exchange economy with uncertainty
and symmetric information. Let N be the set of type-agents. A type-agent is
a couple (i,E) where i is an agent and E is an atom of his information parti-
tion. The set of goods is L. The set of possible states is Ω. The probability of
each state is determined by π. The endowment of type-agent (i,E) in state ω
equals ei(ω) if ω ∈ E and equals zero otherwise. The utility of type-agent (i,E)
for bundle x ∈ RL
+ at ω equals ui(x,ω) if ω ∈ E and equals zero otherwise.
An allocation rule is a function a : Ω → RL×N
+ . The associated allocation rule
in the original economy is a where ai(ω) = a(i,Pi(ω))(ω) for each i ∈ N and
each ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, the allocation rule a in the type-agent representation
4of the economy associated to an allocation rule a in the original economy is
deﬁned as follows: a(i,E)(ω) = ai(ω) if ω ∈ E and a(i,E)(ω) = 0 if ω ∈ Ω\E, for
each (i,E) ∈ N. With this interpretation in mind, it is easy to check that the
type-agent core coincides with the core as usually deﬁned of the type-agent
representation of the economy (see the appendix). Wilson (1978) proves the
non-emptiness of the coarse core by checking the balancedness of a ﬁctitious
cooperative game that is closely related to the type-agent representation of
the economy.
4 Competitive Screening
My objective is to adapt the competitive screening game of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section 13.D, for a modern exposi-
tion) in order to study coalition formation. The argument extends the result
of Perez-Castrillo (1994) by allowing for asymmetric information and non-
transferable utility. Uninformed intermediaries (any number greater or equal
to two) simultaneously oﬀer contracts to the agents. I assume for simplicity
that each intermediary proposes exactly one contract to each agent. A con-
tract for agent i is a function ci : Ω → RL. It speciﬁes net trades. The agents
simultaneously choose at most one contract among those oﬀered. Time goes
by, uncertainty is resolved and agreed-upon contracts are realized. Suppose
that agent i chose some contract ci oﬀered by some intermediary j. Let l ∈ L
and let ω ∈ Ω be the state of the economy. Then agent i is entitled to receive
cl
i(ω) units of good l from intermediary j when cl
i(ω) is positive and interme-
diary j is entitled to receive −cl
i(ω) units of good l from agent i when cl
i(ω) is
negative.
Notice that bankruptcy is possible a priori. An intermediary could promise
to deliver more goods than what he will receive from his clients. An agent
could promise to deliver more goods than what he owns. I want to keep the
analysis as simple as possible and be consistent with the idea underlying the
core that the status quo payoﬀs are guaranteed when challenged. Hence I focus
on markets that are regulated as follows. The regulating authority covers the
deﬁcits. At the same time, it prevents fraudulent promises by inﬂicting a high
punishment (e.g. jail sentence or interdiction to participate to the market
in the future) on the agents and the intermediaries that bankrupt. I further
discuss this assumption and its consequences at the end of the section.
The preferences of the intermediaries are assumed to be continuous and strongly
increasing on RΩ×L
+ . In addition, each intermediary prefers having no good in
each state rather than bankrupting in some state, whatever the amount of
goods he receives in the other states. Similarly, each agent prefers to sign no
contract rather than bankrupting in some state, whatever the amount of goods
5he receives in the other states.
A strategy for an intermediary consists in proposing a contract to each agent. A
strategy for an agent is the choice of whether to sign a contract and, if so, which
one, as a function of the oﬀers made by the intermediaries. A subgame perfect
equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies, one for each agent and each intermediary,
such that 1) the choice of each agent is optimal 2 in each contract signing
game (even those out of the equilibrium path) and 2) the strategy of each
intermediary is optimal against the strategies of the other intermediaries and
the strategies of the agents. Each strategy proﬁle generates an outcome which
speciﬁes an allocation rule for the agents, the amount of goods kept by the
intermediaries, as well as the set of agents and the set of intermediaries that
bankrupt, in each state of the economy.
Theorem 1 An outcome is supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium if
and only if there is no bankruptcy in any state of the economy, the interme-
diaries exactly break even in each good in each state of the economy, and the
allocation rule for the agents belongs to the type-agent core.
Proof: I consider the case where only two intermediaries are competing. The
argument can easily be adapted to show that the theorem remains valid for
any number of intermediaries greater or equal to two.
⇒) It is impossible that some agent bankrupts in some good in some state of
the economy, as choosing to sign no contract would then be a proﬁtable devi-
ation. It is also impossible that some intermediary bankrupts in some good in
some state of the economy as oﬀering the null contract would then be a prof-
itable deviation. Let c = (ci)i∈N be the proﬁle of contracts that is supported by
the subgame perfect equilibrium. It is not necessarily directly oﬀered by one of
the two intermediaries. It is the outcome of the game following the equilibrium
contract oﬀers and selections. Let a be the allocation rule associated to c, i.e.
a = c + e. I prove that a belongs to the type-agent core in three steps. First,
a is feasible. Indeed,
P
i∈N ci(ω) ≤ 0 for each ω ∈ Ω as otherwise at least one
of the two intermediaries bankrupts for some good in some state of the econ-
omy. Second, both intermediaries exactly break even in each good in each state
of the economy. As argued before, none of the two intermediaries bankrupt
in any good in any state of the economy. Hence it is suﬃcient to prove that
P
i∈N ci(ω) ≥ 0 for each ω ∈ Ω, as a positive net quantity of some good in some
state of the economy for some intermediary then means a negative net quantity
(bankruptcy) of that good in that state of the economy for the other interme-
diary. Suppose on the contrary that
P
i∈N cl
i(ω) < 0 for some ω ∈ Ω and some
l ∈ L. Then, one may construct for each  > 0 a proﬁle of contracts d such
2 As the regulating authority covers the deﬁcits, the contract signing game is a
juxtaposition of individual decision problems. The choice of an optimal contract for
an agent is independent of the strategies played by the other agents.











for each ω ∈ Ω. For sure one of the two intermediaries strictly prefers to get
the aggregate equilibrium payoﬀ rather than his own equilibrium payoﬀ. By
continuity of the preferences, proposing d is a proﬁtable deviation for at least
one of the two intermediaries for each  > 0 small enough. I now sketch how
d may be deﬁned. The idea is to equally distribute to the agents in each state
of the economy  additional units of each good in excess supply. Formally,
dl
i(ω) := cl






i(ω) for each other triple (i,l,ω). The payoﬀ in each good l of an







i(ω) < 0, for each ω ∈ Ω. Nevertheless, he could possibly bankrupt
in states ω such that
P
i∈N cl
i(ω) = 0 for each l ∈ L as indiﬀerent agents do
not necessarily choose the deviating oﬀer. I slightly modify the deﬁnition of




i(ω) > 0 for some l ∈ L. Let i ∈ D(c + e,d + e,ω)
be such that dl
i(ω) > 0. A small amount of good l is transferred from agent i
to the other agents. Hence every agent chooses the deviating contract should
it be proposed and should the future state of the economy be ω. The deviat-
ing intermediary now exactly breaks even in that state as well. There could
be new states where the intermediary bankrupts. Fortunately, applying the




i(ω) ≤ 0 for each (l,ω) ∈ L × Ω. Notice though that this
non positive number is not necessarily the continuation payoﬀ of the deviating
intermediary, as some agents not in D(c + e,d + e,ω) could also choose his
contract should the future state be ω. Therefore I modify one more time the
deﬁnition of d by imposing that di(ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω and each i ∈ N
such that i 6∈ D(c + e,d + e,ω). The above modiﬁcations do not aﬀect the
deﬁnition of d at states ω such that D(c + e,d + e,ω) = N. So, the payoﬀ







i(ω) < 0, for each ω ∈ Ω. Third, a is not
blocked. Suppose on the contrary that a is blocked by some allocation rule a0.
Let c0 be the proﬁle of contracts deﬁned as follows: c0
i(ω) := a0
i(ω)−ei(ω) when
i ∈ D(a,a0,ω) and c0
i(ω) := 0 when i ∈ N \ D(a,a0,ω), for each ω ∈ Ω. The
intermediary proposing c0 breaks even in each state of the economy and keeps
some strictly positive amount of some goods in some states of the economy.
Hence c0 is a proﬁtable deviation for both intermediaries, given the second
step of the proof.
⇐) Let a be a feasible allocation rule that cannot be blocked by any allocation
rule. I consider the following strategies. Both intermediaries propose c = a−e.
All the agents go to the ﬁrst intermediary. If the ﬁrst intermediary proposes
something diﬀerent from c, then each agent chooses to stay with him if and
only if he strictly prefers his proposal to c. Otherwise the agents go to the
second intermediary. If the second intermediary proposes something diﬀerent
7from c, then each agent chooses to follow him if and only if he strictly prefers
his proposal to c. Otherwise the agents stay with the ﬁrst intermediary. These
strategies are clearly part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
There is no communication and no information transmission. First, the agents
do not deduce any information from observing the alternative contracts as the
intermediaries are uninformed. Second, the agents do not learn any informa-
tion at the contract signing stage as they sign the contracts simultaneously.
Nevertheless, I obtain a reﬁnement of the coarse core (see theorem 2 and exam-
ple 1 hereafter) because I apply a screening argument to coalition formation.
Some outcomes of the game are not feasible if the regulating authority has no
goods at its disposal. Even if the intermediaries break even in each good in
each state of the economy at equilibrium and even if the intermediaries break
even in each good in each state of the economy when proposing a deviating
contract, it may be the case that some of the active intermediaries facing
an objection bankrupt. This is the usual feature of the competitive screening
games. In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the pooling contract is subject to
a separating objection attracting only the low risk agents when they are not
too numerous in the population. The insurance company oﬀering the pooling
contract bankrupts as it remains with the high risk agents.
If the regulating authority does not have goods at its disposal for covering the
deﬁcits, and if the agents are fully rational in the sense that they anticipate the
possibility of bankruptcy, then one faces an important conceptual diﬃculty.
Suppose that each intermediary has to specify in each state of the economy how
he will re-allocate the endowment of its clients as a function of the set of agents
that choose him. Then the contract signing stage is a Bayesian game instead
of a juxtaposition of independent individual decision problems. Any allocation
rule that is interim individually rational is supported by some subgame perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the competitive screening game. Indeed, choosing an
alternative contract is never proﬁtable if nobody else is signing it. There is a
problem of coordination and of equilibrium selection.
I conclude the section by pointing out some diﬀerences with respect to the
model of Rothschild and Stiglitz. First, I assume that the information of the
agents is veriﬁable at the time of implementing the contracts, although the
risk proﬁle of the agents is not observable when the contract is realized in their
model. Second, my argument is not restricted to one good (money). Third,
feasibility is not expressed in expected terms. The intermediaries break even
in each good in each state of the economy at equilibrium.
85 Properties
Let S be a coalition. An event E ⊆ Ω is common knowledge among the mem-
bers of S if it can be written as a union of elements of Pi for each i ∈ S. An




i∈S ei(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω.
Coalition S has a coarse objection against an allocation rule a if there exist
an allocation rule a0 feasible for S and an event E that is common knowledge
among the members of S such that E(ui(a0
i)|Pi(ω)) > E(ui(ai)|Pi(ω)) for each
i ∈ S and each ω ∈ E. The coarse core is the set of feasible allocation rules
against which no coalition has a coarse objection (Wilson, 1978).
Theorem 2 The type-agent core is a subset of the coarse core.
Proof: Let a be an allocation rule and let (S,a0,E) be a coarse objection against
a. Then a is blocked by the allocation rule a00 where a00
i(ω) := (1 − )a0
i(ω) if
(i,ω) ∈ S × E and a00
i(ω) := ei(ω) otherwise ( > 0 is very small). 
Let a be an allocation rule. A coalition S has a ﬁne objection against a if there
exist an event E and an allocation rule a0 feasible for S such that the two
following properties are true at each ω ∈ E: 1)
T
i∈S Pi(ω) ⊆ E; 2) E(ui(a0
i)|E ∩
Pi(ω)) > E(ui(ai)|E ∩Pi(ω)) for each i ∈ S. The ﬁne core is the set of feasible
allocation rules against which no coalition has a ﬁne objection (Wilson, 1978).
The ﬁne core is a subset of the coarse core. In fact, the ﬁne core is the smallest
conceivable core according to Wilson, as ﬁne objections allow for any kind
of information sharing. This is wrong once we try to understand how the
agreements emerge instead of testing given allocation rules. Example 11 in de
Clippel and Minelli (2003) illustrates this point when the tentative agreements
are proposed by the agents themselves. I adapt the example in order to show
that some ﬁne core allocations may be blocked.
Example 1 I consider a sunspot economy with asymmetric information. There
are two agents, two goods and two equiprobable states for the economy. Agent
1 knows the future state while agent 2 does not: P1 = {{ω1},{ω2}} and
P2 = {{ω1,ω2}}. The endowments are deﬁned as follows: e1(ω) = (0,100) and
e2(ω) = (1,100) for each ω ∈ Ω. The utility functions are deﬁned as follows:
u1(x,ω) = 100x1 + x2 − 100 and u2(x,ω) = x1 + x2 − 101 for each x ∈ R2
+
and each ω ∈ {ω1,ω2}. It is mutually beneﬁcial to exchange good 1. Good 2




ω1 (1,198) (0,2) (0,100) (1,100)
ω2 (1,0) (0,200) (1,97) (0,102)
9The allocation rule a belongs to the ﬁne core but not to the type-agent core.
Indeed, it favors too much agent 1 in ω1 and hence is blocked, by a0 for instance.
There is no general inclusion relation between the type-agent core and the ﬁne
core. Here is an example where the ﬁne core is a subset of the type-agent core.
Example 2 I adapt example 2 of Wilson (1978). There are three agents, one
good (money) and two equiprobable state for the economy. Agent 3 knows
the future state while agents 1 and 2 do not: P1 = P2 = {ω1,ω2} and P3 =
{{ω1},{ω2}}. The endowments are deﬁned as follows: e(ω1) = (100,0,0) and
e(ω2) = (0,100,0). The utility functions are deﬁned as follows: ui(x,ω) =
√
x
for each i ∈ {1,2,3}, each x ∈ R+ and each ω ∈ {ω1,ω2}. The full-insurance
allocation rule giving 50 dollars to each of the two ﬁrst agents in each state
of the economy belongs to both the type-agent core and the coarse core but
not to the ﬁne core. If the agents can communicate, then agent 3 will meet
agent 1 when the state is ω1, convince him that the future state is favorable
to him, and agree with him to implement a diﬀerent allocation, for instance
(75,0,25).
Notice that the ﬁne core may be empty, as in the previous example. Hence it
is remarkable that the type-agent core is never empty even if it is included in
the coarse core and may sometimes be a subset of the ﬁne core.
Theorem 3 The type-agent core is not empty.
The result is a consequence of Scarf (1967), as the type-agent core coincides
with the core of the type-agent representation of the economy.
6 Convergence
An allocation rule a is a constrained market equilibrium if it is feasible and














ω ∈ Ω and each i ∈ N (Wilson, 1978, footnote 6). It is a natural generalization
of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in markets with contingent commodities to
economies with asymmetric information when inside trading is prohibited.
Indeed, in a world with contingent commodities, the uninformed ‘invisible
hand’ speciﬁes a price for each commodity in each state of the economy in
order to clear all the markets. The agents do not learn anything by observing
the price vector as it does not depend on the future state of the economy.
They maximize their expected utilities under the additional constraint that
10they may not sell contingent commodities associated to states that they know
are not going to occur. I further analyze example 2 of Wilson (1978) in order
to illustrate the concept.
Example 3 There are three agents, one good (money) and three equiprob-
able states for the economy. The following table speciﬁes the information and
the endowments of the agents.
Agent(i) Pi ei(ω1) ei(ω2) ei(ω3)
1 {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}} 5 1 3
2 {{ω2},{ω1,ω3}} 3 5 1
3 {{ω3},{ω1,ω2}} 1 3 5
The following table speciﬁes an allocation rule a that is a constrained market
equilibrium for the price vector (1,1,1). It also speciﬁes the associated net-
trades.
Agent(i) ai(ω1) ai(ω1) ai(ω1) zi(ω1) zi(ω2) zi(ω3)
1 5 2 2 0 1 −1
2 2 5 2 −1 0 1
3 2 2 5 1 −1 0
The equilibrium concept allows for some insurance between the two agents
that are not fully informed. This would be impossible if the prices of the three
contingent commodities were varying with the future state of the economy,
much as in rational expectations equilibria. Markets have to clear ex-post
with Wilson’s concept. If for instance the future state is ω1, there is excess
supply (resp. demand) of money in state 2 (resp. 3), as agent 1 is prohibited
to buy or sell these contingent commodities. This is irrelevant as these claims
will not have to be satisﬁed. What matters on the other hand is the fact that
the demand for money from agent 3 is met by the supply of money by agent
2 in state 1. Varying the states, there are three equilibrium equations to be
satisﬁed in total, not nine. The market is not fully decentralized in that sense.
I think instead of an uninformed trading organization proposing the prices in
order to match demand with supply ex-post.
It is easy to check that the set of constrained market equilibria coincides with
the set of Arrow-Debreu equilibria of the type-agent representation of the
11economy suggested in section 3. Hence the next three theorems are corollaries 3
of Debreu and Scarf (1963) (see the appendix).
Theorem 4 Suppose that each agent is endowed with a strictly positive amount
of each good in each state of the economy. Then the set of constrained market
equilibria is not empty.
Theorem 5 The set of constrained market equilibria is a subset of the type-
agent core.
I replicate the agents of the economy described in section 2 as in Serrano et al.
(2001). Let ¯ k be the number of replicas. Each agent of the original economy
now appears ¯ k times. Hence, there are ¯ kN agents in the replicated economy.
Let i ∈ N and let k ∈ {1,...,¯ k}. Copy k of agent i is denoted i.k. Agent
i.k in the replicated economy has the same endowment, the same information
and the same utility function as agent i in the original economy.
Theorem 6 Suppose that each agent’s utility function is strictly concave in
each state of the economy and that each agent is endowed with a strictly pos-
itive amount of each good in each state of the economy. Then, the type-agent
core shrinks to the set of constrained market equilibria as the number of repli-
cas ¯ k tends to inﬁnity. Observe that the type-agent representation of the repli-
cated economy coincides with the Debreu-Scarf replication of the type-agent
representation of the original economy.
A similar result is obtained by Goenka and Shell (1997) for sunspot economies
with restricted market participation. There is uncertainty but no asymmetric
information. The uncertainty does not aﬀect the fundamentals of the economy.
The agents are not necessarily allowed to trade on each market for contingent
goods. Even if the interpretation of the models diﬀer, the notion of sunspot
equilibrium formally coincides with the notion of constrained market equilib-
rium and the idea of quasi-Walrasian economy (Balasko et al., 1995) is equiv-
alent to the type-agent representation I suggest for exchange economies with
asymmetric information. Goenka and Shell deﬁne the core of the sunspot econ-
omy with restricted market participation as the core of the quasi-Walrasian
economy. Without justifying the deﬁnition, they prove a similar convergence
result (Goenka and Shell, 1997, theorem 7.3; Serrano et al., 2001, section 4.1).
It is not clear whether there is anything more than a formal relation between
sunspot economies with restricted market participation and economies with
asymmetric information. In any case, the former would constitute only a small
subclass of the latter.
3 The assumptions of Debreu and Scarf (1963, section 5) are satisﬁed if the con-
sumption set of type-agent (i,E) is the set of contingent goods that are compatible
with his information, i.e. RL×E
+ , for each (i,E) ∈ N.
12Serrano et al. (2001) argue on a simple example that there is no hope to obtain
a convergence result for the coarse or the ﬁne core towards constrained market
equilibria. They show that the negative result is robust with respect to many
alternative deﬁnitions of both the core and the price equilibria. I now explain
why their argument does not apply to the type-agent core.
Example 4 Consider a sunspot economy with two agents, two goods and
two equiprobable states for the economy. Agent 1 knows the future state while
agent 2 does not: P1 = {{ω1},{ω2}} and P2 = {{ω1,ω2}}. The endowments
are deﬁned as follows: e1(ω) = (24,0) and e2(ω) = (0,24) for each ω ∈ Ω.
The utility functions are deﬁned as follows: u1(x,ω) = u2(x,ω) =
√
x1x2 for
each x ∈ R2
+ and each ω ∈ {ω1,ω2}. Let a be the feasible allocation rule
deﬁned as follows: a1(ω1) := (15,15), a1(ω2) := (8,8), a2(ω1) := (9,9) and
a2(ω2) := (16,16). Serrano et al. show that the ¯ k-replication of a belongs to
the coarse core but is not a constrained market equilibrium of the ¯ k-replicated
economy, for each ¯ k ∈ N. It is already blocked in the second replica. The
second replication of a is given by:
a0 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2
ω1 (15,15) (15,15) (9,9) (9,9)
ω2 (8,8) (8,8) (16,16) (16,16)
It is blocked by the following allocation rule:
a00 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2
ω1 (31/2,31/2) (0,0) (17/2,17/2) (0,0)
ω2 (10,13/2) (10,13/2) (28,11) (0,0)
The coalitions are forming as follows: {1.1,2.1} if the future state is ω1 and
{1.1,1.2,2.1} if the future state is ω2.
7 Conclusion
I studied exchange economies with asymmetric information, assuming that
cooperation is achieved through the help of uninformed intermediaries that
compete in an attempt to make some proﬁt. I deﬁned a new notion of core
that coincides with the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of some com-
petitive screening game. Contrarily to Wilson (1978)’s analysis, objections
13are not bound to emerge from state-independent coalitions because the in-
termediaries anticipate each agent’s participation decision as a function of its
private information. The coalitions that form are endogenously determined by
comparing diﬀerent allocation rules. This explains why the type-agent core
may be a strict subset of the coarse core even though it involves no commu-
nication and no information transmission. I proved that the type-agent core
converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria when the economy
is replicated.
I suggest some directions for further research. Communication and informa-
tion transmission could be discussed by modifying the competitive screening
game. The intermediaries could be partially informed and learn additional in-
formation by observing the choices of the agents. The agents themselves could
learn some information before choosing a contract if they observe the choice of
other agents. More generally, there is a need for a better strategic foundation
of core concepts in exchange economies with asymmetric information. 4 I an-
alyzed a variant of the procedure suggested by Perez-Castrillo (1994). Other
procedures supporting the core under complete information (see e.g. Perry
and Reny, 1994; Serrano, 1995; Serrano and Vohra, 1997) should be studied as
well. Finally, the type-agent core and its non-cooperative justiﬁcation should
be extended to situations where the information is not veriﬁable at the time of
implementing the agreements. Myerson (1995, 2003) considers entrepreneurs
devising alternative market organizations and mediators helping the agents to
coordinate. It would be illuminating if his core concepts could be characterized
as the set of equilibrium outcomes associated with some explicit competitive
screening game.
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15Appendix The Core and the Arrow-Debreu Equilibria of the Type-Agent
Representation
I refer to the last paragraph of section 3 for the deﬁnition of the type-agent repre-
sentation of the economy. I denote by e(i,E) : Ω → RL
+ the endowment of type-agent
(i,E): e(i,E)(ω) := ei(ω) if ω ∈ E, e(i,E)(ω) := 0 if ω ∈ Ω \ E, for each (i,E) ∈ N.
Subsets of N are called coalitions. An allocation rule a is feasible for coalition S if P
(i,E)∈S a(i,E)(ω) ≤
P
(i,E)∈S e(i,E)(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. An allocation rule a0 Pareto
dominates an allocation rule a for coalition S if E(u(i,E)(a0
(i,E))) > E(u(i,E)(a(i,E)))
for each (i,E) ∈ S. The core is the set of allocation rules that are feasible for N
and such that there do not exist a coalition S and an allocation rule a0 feasible for
S that Pareto dominates a for S.
Proposition A1 Let a be an allocation rule that belongs to the type-agent core. Then
the associated allocation rule a belongs to the core of the type-agent representation
of the economy.
Proof: Notice that a is feasible for N. Indeed, for each ω ∈ Ω,
P
i∈N ai(ω) ≤ P









(i,E)∈N e(i,E)(ω). Suppose now that there exist a
coalition S and an allocation rule a0 feasible for S that Pareto dominates a for S
in the type-agent representation of the economy. Given the preferences of the type-
agents, I may assume without loss of generality that a0
(i,E)(ω) = 0 for each (i,E) ∈ N
and each ω ∈ Ω such that ω 6∈ E. Let then a0 be the allocation rule deﬁned as fol-
lows: a0
i(ω) := a0
(i,Pi(ω))(ω) for each couple (i,ω) ∈ N × Ω such that (i,Pi(ω)) ∈ S,
and a0
i(ω) := 0 for each other couple (i,ω) ∈ N × Ω. Notice that, for each ω ∈ Ω,




















i∈N s.t. (i,Pi(ω))∈S e(i,Pi(ω))(ω)
=
P




for each ω ∈ Ω. If a0 is not strictly feasible when proposed against a, then one may
slightly modify a0 as follows. There exist ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ D(a,a0,ω) such that a0
i(ω) >
0. One of the positive components of a0
i(ω) is decreased while keeping D(a,a0,ω)
unchanged. The resulting allocation rule is strictly feasible when proposed against
a. 
Proposition A2 Let a be an allocation rule that belongs to the core of the type-
agent representation of the economy. Then the associated allocation rule a belongs
to the type-agent core.













i∈N ei(ω). Suppose now that a is blocked by an allo-
cation rule a0 in the original economy. Let then S be the coalition deﬁned as follows:
S = {(i,E) ∈ N|E(ui(a0
i)|E) > E(ui(ai)|E)}. Let also a0 be an allocation rule such
that a0
(i,E)(ω) = a0
i(ω) if ω ∈ E and a0
(i,E)(ω) = 0 if ω ∈ Ω\E, for each each (i,E) ∈ S.

































for each (i,E) ∈ S. 
An allocation rule a is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent representation












ω0∈Ω p(ω0).e(i,E)(ω0), and each
(i,E) ∈ N.
Proposition B1 Let a be a constrained market equilibrium. Then the associated
allocation rule a is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent representation of
the economy.
Proof: Notice that a is feasible for N as in proposition A1. Let p be the price
system supporting a as a constrained market equilibrium. Let (i,E) ∈ N and let
a0
(i,E) ∈ RL×Ω






the preferences of type-agent (i,E), I may assume without loss of generality that
a0
(i,E)(ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω \ E. Let ω ∈ E and let a0
i ∈ R
L×Pi(ω)
+ be deﬁned as
follows: a0
i(ω0) := a0















i)|Pi(ω)) ≤ π(Pi(ω))E(ui(ai)|Pi(ω)) =
E(u(i,E)(a(i,E))). 
17Proposition B2 Let a be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent represen-
tation of the economy. Then the associated allocation rule a is a constrained market
equilibrium.
Proof: Notice that a is feasible as in proposition A2. Let p be the price sys-
tem supporting a as an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the type-agent representa-
tion of the economy. Let i ∈ N, let ω ∈ Ω, let a0
i ∈ R
L×Pi(ω)




ω0∈Pi(ω) p(ω0).ei(ω0) and let a0
i ∈ RL×Ω
+ be deﬁned as
follows: a0
(i,E)(ω0) := a0
i(ω0) for each ω0 ∈ Pi(ω) and a0
(i,E)(ω0) := 0 for each ω0 ∈



















π(Pi(ω)) = E(ui(ai)|Pi(ω)). 
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